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R¯ ıga Stradin ¸š University, Latvia
Abstract. The article deals with the issue of society integration politics in Latvia,
analyzing the question of collective memories becoming a tool for communication between
generations on vital themes of Latvian memory politics, such as the issue of 1940 Soviet
occupation, the so-called “Soviet times” (1945–1991) and the current activities of various
political actors concerning minority rights in Latvia. The major stumbling block of the
integration politics until recently has been unsuccessful politics of the past – various
controversies of the 20th century have not been treated dialogically, but rather misused by
antagonistic political powers to create the negative Other of the political rivals. The result
is two decades of a weak and unsuccessful dialogue on the Latvian past.
Introduction
Latest Developments of Society Integration in Latvia and Analytical Framework.
Since the beginning of the 1990ies Latvia has been moving towards the Western political culture.
While being a part of the Soviet state, Latvian society underwent various crucial structural changes
which have been of great signiﬁcance after the breakdown of the USSR1. Not only were pre-war
political and cultural elites of the country eliminated during various actions of the Stalinism politics
in the 1940ies – mass deportations and arrests left massive collective traumas which were silenced
during the Brezhnev period and came into political discourses as late as the beginning of perestroika
period in the late 1980ies2.
Until now history of the 20th century keeps its leading position in the political and even economic
agendas in Latvia, shapes and also blocks various processes in the current Latvian society, such as
interethnic dialogue and society integration. Latvian academic debates on society integration have
entered the second decade, producing regularly various studies and analysis, political recommendations
and research projects. One of the major actors in these debates has been the Society Integration
foundation which was established in 2001 to support the integration politics. The Foundation tries to
achieve two goals – support of civic activities of the Latvian ethnic minorities, which constitute about
1 For details of the societal structural changes during the Soviet period 1945–1991 see: Okup¯ acijas rež¯ ımi Baltijas valst¯ ıs 1940–
1991: Latvijas V¯ esturnieku komisijas 2008. gada p¯ et¯ ıjumi un starptautisk¯ as konferences materi¯ ali, 2008. gada 30.–31. oktobris,
R¯ ıga. – R¯ ıga: Latvijas v¯ estures instit¯ uta apg¯ ads, 2009. – (Latvijas V¯ esturnieku komisijas raksti, 25. s¯ ej.)
2 See for details on the so-called “third awakening” in the 1980ies: Stradin ¸š J. Treš¯ a atmoda: raksti un runas 1988.–1990. gad¯ a
Latvij¯ a un par Latviju. – R¯ ıga: Zin¯ atne, 1992.
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40% of the Latvian population and is unevenly situated in the larger cities and towns of Latvia with
Daugavpils and the capital Riga at the top. The other aim of the Foundation is to support long-lasting
analysis of the integration politics, including media space, which, according to various Latvian scientists
play crucial role in the integration politics and politics of the past3.
In this article, politics of the past will be deﬁned as an integral part of the politics of integration in
Latvia. According to French historian and sociologist, one of the founders of the paradigm of collective
memory Pierre Nora, past exists within two confronting phenomena – history and memory, which have
different, confronting functions in explaining the past to a person or a group, to a society in general.
Nora deﬁned borderlines between memory and history not according to the quality of their sources,
but according to their functions4. History is a scientiﬁc, structured and “sterile” (if it is possible at
all!) process of analysis, which removes collective emotions – fears, fantasies and tendency to create
and sustain myths. All these functions can be traced back to collective memory and its role in creating
collective meanings – Nora states that memory is emotional and can combine issues, dates and facts
which are otherwise “expelled” from the realm of academic analysis of the past or are not logical. The
concept ofNoraisbasedonhisattemptstorediscover andreinterprettheconcepts ofMoriceHalbwachs,
a French interwar period sociologist, whose various articles, but mainly his major work on “Collective
memory” have created the basis for collective (cultural) memory schools in different European academic
circles5.
Morice Halbwachs stated that no memories can occur in an individual mind except when delivered
by collective experience and societal pressure on the “clean” individual memory6. No doubt, since the
rediscovery of Halbwachs in French and later in Anglo-Saxon academic tradition, memory studies
made a breath-taking breakthrough in various academic disciplines and now inhabit interdisciplinary
area of social sciences and humanities, visual arts and even theology7. Among the most remarkable
theoreticians of the cultural/collective memory paradigm are Jan and Aleida Assmann, who are treating
collective memories in ancient classical cultures, Renaissance cultures and in European literatures of
the 19th century8. One of the most important theses produced by Jan Assmann in the 1990ies concerns
memory or mnemonic structures in their relations to collective identities and generations. According
to Jan Assmann’s memory classiﬁcation, there are two types of collective memory and the difference
lies in their ability to reach different age groups or generations. Assmann stated in his famous analysis
“Cultural Memory” that there is a communicative memory, which unites in its meaning production
process at least by three generations and there is also a cultural memory, which consists of events
and personalities which had never been experienced directly but any of the three generations, such as
mythical personalities and actors of ancient or medieval history. Both types of collective memory exist
in speciﬁc forms, are transmitted by various media, reﬂect and construct time concepts and have two
different groups of bearers or persons in charge of memory (Assmann uses the German term “Träger”).9
3 Details on the functions of the Society Integration foundation see the website of the Foundation: http://www.lsif.lv/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=11&lang=en (last viewed 20. January 2013).
4 Nora P. Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis. – Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1998. – S. 13–14.
5 For example: Apfelbaum E. Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory. In: Radstone S., Schwary B. (eds.) Memory.
Histories, Theories, Debates. – Fordham University Press, 2010. – pp. 77–92.
6 Halbwachs M. Collective Memory. See Chapter 5 of on-line version: http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/hawlbachsspace.pdf
(version as of 1950) – p. 14.
7 See for example: Volf M. The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World: Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing,
2006.
8 The major work of Jan Assmann on the issue of this article is: Assmann J. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und
politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. – München: Becksche Reihe, 1997.
9 Assmann J. Communicative and Cultural Memory. In: Erll A., Nünning A. (eds.). A Companion to Cultural Studies. – De
Gruyter, 2010. – p. 117. The term appeared in the German version of the text on cultural memory: see note 6. – p. 56.
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All these elements – forms, media, time concepts and bearers of memory are highly relevant to
the Latvian case of integration politics. Let me mention just three major arguments in favour of this
statement.
Firstly, Latvian society underwent very rapid changes two decades ago and is still in transformation
process as a part of global changes. Although transformation of economics and political culture are still
in progress, Latvians, irrespectively of ethnic origin and linguistic identities, have experienced a kind
of political “hour zero” when almost half a century of Soviet political and economic structure ﬁnally
and extremely quickly (I would suggest two – three days of the Janajev et altera coup d‘etat in August
1991 in Moscow – as a time measurement unit) disappeared. In collective memories of Latvians this
was the beginning of a new life or, rather the return to the old and forbidden independent state of the
late 1930ies.
Secondly, the structural changes of society during extreme industrialization of the country in the
60ies and 70ies, which lasted until the mid of 80ies, introduced a unique situation which affected
memory politics not only at the state policy level, but also at the level of everyday memory processes.
In the situation of sudden end of political control over individual and collective memories mnemonic
processesbecamevarious,plural–JacquesLeRiderinhisessayonCentralEuropeasaplaceofmemory
(taking over the concept of Nora’s lieu de memoire) stated that politics of memory and places of memory
have been central elements of dissident politics – this is certainly true for Latvian case when Riga
Forest Cemetery (Meža kapi)10 and the monument of Freedom in the centre of Riga11 became points of
dissident resistance and alternative remembering during the Soviet time.12
Thirdly, the plurality of memories in a democratic society requires ways and tools of ﬁnding
a common language not only for shaping political discourse on the past, but also on dealing with
confronting memories in everyday discourses, which do not stay in private space but play an important
role in various forms of direct democracy, such as referendum on the status of Russian language in
Latvia, which took place on February 18, 2012 and was aimed at proclaiming Russian language another
ofﬁcial language in Latvia. In this situation linguistic issue became an issue of clashes for interpretation
of the past – on the one hand a symbolic revenge of the “suppressed” minorities, “supported” by a new
political party “For Mother Tongue” (Russian – ZAR ), on the other hand the “ﬁnal” contest for the
dominance of the Latvian language and culture in Latvia – so styled by central-right political wing and
many representatives of Latvian ethnic cultural elites13.
But there is another, more important, issue to be dealt with within the integration politics – the
past concepts can be not only generations dividing element, but can form a generation bridge, a supra-
generation mnemonic structures to unite various generations within one distinct concept of collective
memories, which may be very distant from academic version of the past.
10 During the Soviet times various graves of famous politicians and writers of the interwar period were in different ways made
unaccesable. Putting ﬂowers there was considered an act of political protest and was carefully noted by the KGB staff.
11 The monument replaced the equestrian monument of Russian Tzar Peter I. Lost after the First World War. After WW II there
were plans to destroy the monument, but these plans were never put into practice thanks to the famous Soviet sculptur Vera
Muhina. Putting ﬂowers to this monument on November 18 (date of the foundation of Latvia) was considered an act of political
disloyaltytotheSovietregimeandcouldaffecteducationalorcareerplans,forexampleastudentwhoputﬂowerstothemonument
was dismissed from the university.
12 Le Rider J. Mitteleuropa as a lieu de memoire. In: Erll A., Nünning A. (eds.). A Companion to Cultural Studies. – De Gruyter,
2010. – p. 39, 41.
13 Here are some of the latest articles on the issue of referendum written jointly with a colleague of mine from the University of
Latvia: Hanov D., T¯ eraudkalns V. Denying the Other in the Cyber Space: Democracy and Political Culture in Latvia: Analysis of
the Internet Campaign “For Mother Tongue” (November 2011)// Ethnicity 2012/6. – pp. 4–24. All PDF versions of the journal
Ethnicity are available on-line on the website of Daugavpils University: www.du.lv (search for “ethnicity”); Extended version of
the article with analysis of the latest campaign see: Hanovs D., T¯ eraudkalns V. New Diaspora Nationalism in Latvia? Russian
Identity in Internet Campaigns “For Mother Tongue” (2011) and “Change the Law on Citizenship” (2012) // Scientiae et Patriae.
Velt¯ ıjums akad¯ emiíei profesorei Vairai V¯ ık ¸ei-Freibergai 75. dzimšanas dien¯ a. / Cimdin ¸a A., sast. R¯ ıga: LU Akad¯ emiskais apg¯ ads,
2012, pp. 147–164.
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According to Jan Assman bearers of memory create and sustain generational gaps and create
generation bridges mentioned above. To sum up the introduction part of the article, the following should
be mentioned: both phenomena – generational gaps and bridges exist in Latvian memory space, which
can be characterized as both ethnically and age divided memory space. What are the major elements of
the Latvian memory landscape? Before turning to the overview of these elements in details in the next
chapter, they should be merely touched upon here in few lines: there are memories of ethnic Latvians,
in which traumatic experience of Soviet occupation and mass deportations are predominant, but do not
exclude the existence of Soviet “positive” memories, although these are “down and out” of the ofﬁcial
political and media discourse, except some examples of consumer society shaped products of nostalgia.
Another set of memories exists predominantly among those ethnic minorities, whose ancestors or they
personally settled in Latvia after 1940, the year of occupation, as a result of Soviet economic inner
migration,educationprocess,maritalplans,etc.Thisgroup,whichisfarfrombeinghomogeneousisstill
shaped by its experience in Latvia of the 70ies and 80ies, especially what concerns the unofﬁcial status
of predominant ethnic group in Soviet Union – the Russian. What are the major mnemonic conﬂicts and
how do these conﬂicts affect generational dialogue or conﬂicts in current Latvian integration discourse?
Who remembers what? Conﬂicting memories in Latvia
According to researchers Vita Zelˇ ce un Martin ¸š Kapr¯ ans, who based their theses on the sociological
opinion polls in the beginning of the 90ies, less than 30% of the respondents as children new that their
parents suffered from the Soviet regime.14 Vita Zelˇ ce stated in the last Report on the Development of the
Nation in 2011, that there are clear differences in the support for the idea that “the cohesion of Latvian
societyshouldbebasedontheideaofLatvian(ethnic)cultureandLatvianlanguage.”15 Thesamesurvey
shows that the common ground for Latvia’s development is to be found in the area of civic rights and
duties of a citizen, not in the predominance of culture of ethnic majority – thus respondents are mostly
unanimous in their support for rule of law, ﬁght against corruption and other social issues.16 Authors of
the analysis formulated various proposals to enlarge the share of civic values in the integration policy in
Latvia, as these values re shared by both ethnic “groups”.17
Another important element of Latvian memory culture is the predominant image of Latvians as
collective victim of the 20th century regimes, mostly of the long lasting communism regime.18 This
predominant collective self-image is being supported in regular circle of politically important dates,
such as various days of remembrance of communism genocide, as well as deportations before and after
1945. The Latvian version of community of suffering is not unique, but is rather a local version of
a global community identity based on collective trauma – the Jewish community shapes globally its
collective identity through sufferings during the Holocaust, as Esther Benbassa stated in her analysis.19
Commemoration techniques in Latvia are concentrated on the image of the Latvian ethnic nation that
suffered and, as Vita Zelˇ ce and Nils Muižnieks formulated in the volume “Combating memories”,
history has become a ﬁeld for political activities, thus excluding those who really suffered or participated
in the World War II from the event, which replaces mnemonic activities of the witnesses.20
14 K¯ aprans M., Zelˇ ce V. (eds.) P¯ ed¯ ejais karš: atmin ¸a un traumas komunik¯ acija. – R¯ ıga: Mansards, 2011. – 21. lpp.
15 Latvija. P¯ arskats par tautas att¯ ıst¯ ıbu 2011. – lpp. 36. This report is available on-line: http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/
resources/TAP/Latvija_TAP_2011.pdf
16 Ibid.
17 The Report operates with traditional two larger and abstract groups such as majority and minorities wuthout specifying that
there are about 145 ethnic minorities in Latvia and various groups have had their experience of living among ethnic majority. Also
regional dimensions are rather understated.
18 Ibid. – lpp. 38.
19 Benbassa E. Suffering as Identity. The Jewish Paradigm. London: Verso, 2007.
20 Muižnieks N., Zelˇ ce V. (eds.) Karojoš¯ a piemin ¸a. 16. marts un 9. maijs. – R¯ ıga: Zin¯ atne, 2011. – lpp. 160, 170.
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Memoriesofbeingavictimarerepeatedannuallyduringtheso-calledmarchofthesurvivedveterans
of the Latvian SS Legion on March 16 in the centre of the Old Town in Riga, each year becoming a tool
for political combats and media headlines. The history of the creation of the Legion is too complex to
be reﬂected on several pages here, but one must be stated – the history of the Latvian soldiers forced
to choose between two military powers, both equipped with effective terror and oppression system has
becomethetoolforboth,inter-generationalgapandalsoforbridgesbetweengenerationsofgrandfathers
and grandchildren. These gaps and bridges are being built and sustained along the borders of ethnicity.
March 16 has been reshaped from a commemoration date of the Latvians who were forced to join
the SS troops into a day of national unity and collective memory day. I would even suggest this day has
become a day of ethnic consolidation via ethnic memories and collective traumas and in this function the
commemoration process is turned into political event which serves aims of acquiring symbolic capital
and dominance over past interpretation – Pierre Bourdieu’s formula explaining struggle for discursive
control of reality is well applied to the current inter-ethnic communication in Latvia.
Following the ideas of Jan Assman, who has been inﬂuenced by the works of late Nora and his
project “Places of memories”, we may deﬁne the “Träger” of the Latvian collective memories of the
World War II and post war period, including the period of independence since early 1990ies – these
are various groups. First of all these are participants of the everyday oral history – veterans. Their
grandchildren are now coming of age and even become active politicians, such as a member of the
government coalition, “National Union” and its youth part – “All for Latvia”. These politicians make
up another group of bearers of communicative memory, among whom one of the most successful is a
politician Raivis Dzintars, are regularly participating in the march of the Legion veterans on March 16.
It is necessary to add that this discourse of collective trauma presupposes the construction of
collective responsibility – in Latvian case this is being ascribed by the right wing political discourse
to an abstract ethnic Other, minorities or in political slang the Russians in Latvia. The fact that ethnicity
and not political regime or ideology has become the term for a group whose collective responsibility is
deﬁned by Latvian political discourses shapes various integration issues: there are still about 300000
non-citizens in Latvia and the naturalization tempo is slowing down each year.21 (last viewed 5.01.
2013.) The recently adopted “State Programme for Integration (2012–2018)” has been already criticized
by me in various articles, but the major deﬁcit should be mentioned repeatedly – the idea of the Latvian
nation is still not inclusive, the predominant idea of the state programme is to reestablish justice in
the history of ethnic Latvians and to unite Latvian population on the basis of ethnic culture. Thus the
hierarchy of the new state policy paper was immanent, and the former minister of culture Sarm¯ ıte ¯ Elerte
(Party “Unity”) formulated this idea by the term “state shaping nation” which includes only ethnic
Latvians – all other groups may become a part of Latvian cultural frame, but from the very beginning
there is only one group which forms the state and is symbolically in charge of the statehood of Latvia.22
The so-called Other in the Latvian ethnic memories are ethnic minorities. Latvian minorities are far
from being ahomogenous group, both intheir collective memories and intheir experience of integration,
although in everyday political discourse most ethnic non-Latvians are usually signiﬁed by Latvians as
RussiansandthesamelabelisattachedtovariousminoritiesbyRussianpoliticalNGOs.EthnicRussians
are still predominant among non-citizens, but Roma, Jews, Poles and Ukrainians all differ from the
Russian minority: for example almost all Roma are Latvian citizens and are ﬂuent in Latvian. To make
the ethnic landscape even more complicated, the pre War minorities differ from those, who came after
1945 – there are for example Old Believers, who are a unique combination of religious and ethnic group.
21 Non-citizens in Latvia are not allowed to participate in both municipal and parliamentary elections. The Law on Citizenship
has created positive framework for naturalization, but the number of naturalized citizens is growing very slowly. In 2005 there
were 19000 naturalized, but in 2011 only 2467. For the latest data on non-citizens in 2012 see website of the State Citizenship
and Migration Ofﬁce: http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/statistika/Naturalizacija.html.
22 State programme for National Identity, Civil society and Integration Politics is available in Latvian at: http://www.pmlp.
gov.lv/lv/statistika/Naturalizacija.html (last viewed February 12, 2013).
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Various researchers have been analyzing social proﬁles of Russian-speaking minorities since the mid of
1990ies.23
V. Zelˇ ce stated that during the 1990ies Russian-speaking collective identities have been shaped
by two major tendencies, both inherited from the Soviet ethnic policy, which, according the Jeffrey
Hosking has created a dominant Russian ethnic-social group in all Soviet republics thus preparing latent
inter-ethnic conﬂicts during the collapse of the Soviet empire.24 The ﬁrst tendency was alienation from
Latvianethnicandlinguisticspace25 –aninterviewedpersonAnna,31yearsold,Russian,livinginRiga,
confessed that during her childhood and teenager age (end of 1980ies) she lived in one of the so-called
“sleeping districts” at the outskirts of Riga, a district built in the early 1980ies and inhabited mainly
by ethnic minorities, and “had no idea that Latvians existed.”26 This remark may be used to illustrate
not only an individual experience of cultural and communicative alienation, but may also serve as an
explanation for the issue of Latvian language proﬁciency in the 1990ies which lasts until present day –
although the situation changes for the better and more and more non-Latvians speak Latvian and use it in
theeverydaylife27,linguisticskillsdonotnecessarilyaddtothefeelingofbelongingoropeningupone’s
identity to other cultures. Following the concept of community as disturbing factor of the state policy,
formulated by Homi K. Bhabha28, we may suggest, that position of ethnic minorities in ethnic Latvian
discourses is shaped by two factors: their “origin” from the USSR as non-Western, non-democratic
and “non-modernised” state and by collective imagination of Latvians suffered from Soviet occupation.
AnotherusefulargumentbyBhabhaislinkedtopost-colonialtheoreticalframe–colonisedcommunities
refuse to participate in the state affairs as its subjects.29 This refusal of civic participation shaped Latvian
intellectual opposition to the Soviet regime, but may as well be characteristic of a certain community
in a democratic society – in Latvia de-colonisation of post Soviet ethnic Latvian community called
de-sovietisation, was followed by rapid transformation of former Soviet Russians into minorities, held
responsible for the Soviet period and communism regime. The experience of becoming minority, large
part of which also became non-citizens (in 2012 about 14% of Latvian population are still non-citizens,
among them about 65% are ethnic Russians), as well as predominant negative right-wing Latvian
political discourse shaped by mistrust and negative images of ethnic Other can be interpreted in terms
of symbolic re-colonization, led by Latvian political discourse towards ethnic minorities. In this case
growing local conservative Russian nationalistic discourse which is becoming more and more visible,
especially in cyberspace, may be interpreted in Bhabhian terms – as refusal to support a nation state and
its politics, such as institute of naturalization, participation in Latvian ethnic culture, Latvian language
expansion among minorities. Such ways of refusal are characteristic of minorities in societies, where
majority political discourses tend to use exclusion techniques as a form of creating omnipresent majority
culture. This type of modernization can be explained with concept of Frederick Cooper, who states that
modernisation may cause frustrations and fears, when communities perceive themselves as being at
risk of loosing their identities.30 To go one step further, we may state that Latvian minority conservative
23 To mention the most signiﬁcant studies of the last decade: Apine I., Volkovs V. Latvijas krievu identit¯ ate. V¯ esturisks un
sociolo‘ gisks apcer¯ ejums. – LU Filozoﬁjas un socioloìijas instit¯ uts: R¯ ıga, 2007.; Š¯ upule I., Krastin ¸a L. et altera Etnisk¯ a tolerance
un Latvijas sabiedr¯ ıbas integr¯ acija. – R¯ ıga: BSZI, 2004.; Zepa B., Š¯ upule I. et altera Etnopolitisk¯ a spriedze Latvij¯ a: konﬂikta
risin¯ ajuma mekl¯ ejumi. – R¯ ıga: BSZI, 2005.
24 For detailed analysis see: Hosking G. Rulers and Victims. The Russians in the Soviet Union. – Cambridge, 2006. – p. 140, 163,
190, 365, 405.
25 Parskats par tautas att¯ ıst¯ ıbu 2011 – lpp. 41.
26 Name changed, partly structured interview took place in Riga on January 12, 2013 and lasted for 37 minutes.
27 For the role of the Latvian language proﬁciency in integration politics see: Djaˇ ckova S. Latviešu valodas zin¯ ašanas un
sabiedr¯ ıbas integr¯ acija. – R¯ ıga: PROVIDUS, 2004.; Veisbergs A. Latviešu valoda – past¯ av¯ ıg¯ a un main¯ ıg¯ a. – R¯ ıga: Valsts valodas
komisija, 2007.
28 Bhabha H. K. The Location of Culture. – New York: Routledge, 1994. – p. 330.
29 Ibid.
30 Cooper Fr. Kolonialismus denken: Konzepte und Theorien in kritischer Perspektive. – Frankfurt: Campus, 2012. – S. 202.
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discourse,whichwillbetoucheduponfurther,isgrowing,butinclusivediscourseisrapidlydisappearing
– both processes signify insufﬁcient political will of ethnic majority elites to create inclusive discourse
for Latvian society after the breakdown of the USSR. In the beginning of the second decade of the
21st century Bhabhian refusal of community has grown and has got its communicative forms, bearers
and time concept in the referendum in February 2012, in new minority conservative political party
“ZARJA”, in website “Rodina.lv” and other forms31. In these elements the non-acceptance of Latvian
dominant politics towards minorities is becoming heavier, more stable and less able to alter.
Another tendency during the Soviet regime was the belief into the Soviet version of the Latvian
history, transmitted and sustained by decades of falsiﬁed Latvian history in the school books, university
lectures and public media, including cinema. This isanother vital element ofthe refusaldescribed above.
The author of this article remembers his own school years when Latvian history in the 20th century
was deﬁned as the way through bourgeois and militant pro-fascistic regime of the late president K¯ arlis
Ulmanis,32 until the Latvian communist party, which was forbidden during the regime of Ulmanis ﬁnally
overthrew the regime and proclaimed the Soviet republic – this was the ofﬁcial Soviet version of what
is known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which divided Poland and the Baltics before the advent of the
Second World War. The pact became known in the late 1980ies and has become the major proof of the
false interpretation of Latvian history during the occupation regime. This document and the historic fact
of aggression and not “joyous joining of the family of Soviet republics” as Soviet pupils were taught,
became the major act of symbolic alienation of minorities during the 90ies. During the preparation
campaign for the collection of signatures for the referendum on the status of Russian language in Latvia
in November 2011, among some of the conservative diaspora groups of Russian minorities the non
acceptance of the fact of occupation became one of the most effective tools for public mobilization of
voters. It is of interest, that the Internet space is predominantly occupied with the issues of identities as
conﬂicting political agents – for example the website of NGO “Rodina.lv” [motherland.lv in Russian]
echoes the idea of the “state nation” in the above mentioned state policy paper for integration and
provides a memory-shaped emotional answer for the thesis by Ministry of Culture : “Latvia is a two
communities state and Russians are one of the two state shaping communities.”33 The manifesto states
that two groups are integral and equal parts of the state and there are no minorities as such, but there
are Russians (the manifesto also states that in the modern world the ethnicity is of no importance).34
Among other products of collective memory formulated in the text are the following visions of the
Latvian Russians: Russian assisted Latvians in their coming into status of a nation. But the most radical
rejection of European and Latvian academic research and archive documents on the causes of Latvian
occupation is the following part of the manifesto under the title: “Was there the occupation of Latvia?”:
31 The question remains open whether elements of the minority discourse mentioned are right, conservative or
left wing with radical elements in it. One of the prominant ﬁgures of the party “ZARJA” Andrey Berdnikov
stated in his recent interview, that this division is outdated. He deﬁned the party as “positive populist” movement
againts elites. See: Berdn ¸ikovs A. V¯ elos spraig¯ akas un provokat¯ ıv¯ akas diskusijas. // Latvijas Av¯ ıze, 07. 01. 2013.
http://la.lv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=369546:berdikovs-vlos-spraigkas-un-provokatvkas-diskusijas (last
viewed 9.01. 2013.)
32 K¯ arlis Ulmanis was the last president of Latvia before occupation in 1940. He seized the power and became an authoritarian
leader of the state, called Vadonis in May 1934 after coup supported by militia and army, as well as by massive positive support
of the majority of the population. Ulmanis remained president until July 1940 and was later arrested and deported to the inner
provinces of the USSR where he died in a prison hospital. See more on this period of Latvian history in the latest publication in
English: Hanovs D., T¯ eraudkalns V. Ultimate Freedom-No Choice. Culture of Authoritarianism in Latvia, 1934-1940. – Holland:
Brill, 2013.
33 Manifest: Latvijskije russkije v voprosah I otvetah: http://rodina.lv/manifest/1-manifest (last viewed 10. 01. 2013.)
34 Ibid.
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In 1940, the Republic of Latvia, which existed since 1918 following the decision of its parliament,35
joined the USSR. The Soviet troops were stationed following the acceptance by the president K¯ arlis
Ulmanis.36
This vision of the Latvian past can be explained in terms of cultural translation, which, according
to Bhabha “desacralizes” the transparent assumption of cultural supremacy...”37 – in this particular case
desacralization or in Bhabha’s vocabulary “blasphemie” is to name judicial acts of illegal pro-Soviet
parliament as legal, thus symbolically cancelling occupation through making it the decision made freely
by representatives of Latvian population in 1940.
Bhabha states in various places the role of performance in cultural communication38 – this thesis
can be described by various actions of minority activists on dates which not only commemorate events
(wars, victories, death or birth of charismatic persons of the past, etc.) but are becoming translation tools
for local minorities in ﬁnding their identities in Latvia.
Translational version of the Latvian past where minorities may discover upgrade of their social
image, ﬁnds its visual articulation during the commemoration of another “problematic” date – May 9,
the end of the Great Fatherland War in the Soviet Union. Each year veterans of the Soviet army, together
with their relatives and politicians from party union “Harmony” (Saskan ¸a) gather in front of the statue
of “Liberators of Riga” – the ensemble of Red Army soldiers erected during the Soviet period on the
spot where the so-called “Square of Victory” during the late 1930ies was used for festive occasions of
the regime of K¯ arlis Ulmanis. These annual gatherings are visited also by the representatives of the Riga
Council, including a Russian mayor Nil Ushakov. This young mayor was in favour of Russian language
campaign and set his signature for the referendum. At the same time the fewer Soviet veterans there are,
the more youngsters, the generation of their grandchildren are present during the celebrations on
May 9. As You tube videos show, certain kind of inter-generational bridge has been established
recreating or staging the Soviet past – with red ﬂags and youth guard who carries these ﬂags and
are proud of their grandfathers.39 At the same time simultaneous presence of Russian celebration in
Moscow is available via satellite TV broadcast on wide screens located in the area of the monument.
Another element of the concept of glorious past of the ethnic minorities is that the modern Russia took
over from the Soviet Union the paradigm of the winner of the ﬁght against fascism, who carried the
most casualties and deaths – this image is being used in the current so-called “anti-fascist” concept
which is staged annually during the protests against the march of the Latvian legion veterans – activists
dressed up like concentration camp prisoners shout various critical comments during the march. The
Latvian television and predominantly Latvian-speaking printed media depict the festivities of May 9 at
the monument in rather pejorative way, focusing visual aspects on vodka, herring and dances with war
time songs – long lasting media content analysis conducted by me during the last 5 years of celebrations
support this suggestion of the techniques of eliminating the Other through laughing at the “sacred”
images of the Other. Russian embassy in Latvia still acts as an important external actor of the internal
Latvian debates on the politics of the past – when the Catholic archbishop of Latvia Zbign ¸evs Stankeviˇ cs
suggested in spring 2012 the idea of creating one commemoration day for all Latvian war veterans who
did not ﬁght for their country but were soldiers in two foreign armies, the Russian Foreign Ministry
35 The Parliament was elected after Soviet troops entered Riga and the president was forced to allow parties, including communist
party. The parliamentary elections under the supervision of Soviet security police were not accepted as free and democratic in
Europe and the USA later declared that it does not recognize the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR.
36 Ibid.
37 Bhabha H. K. The location of Culture...–p.327.
38 Ibid. – p. 326.
39 Video of the celebrations on May 9, 2011 in Riga: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_rpJWPbWnI (last viewed 14 January
2013).
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reacted with sharp critics, accusing the archbishop of an attempt to equate Soviet veterans with Legion
veterans.40
To sum up some of the examples of parallel interpretations of the Latvian past, the following
should be stated: ﬁrstly, there are two parallel ethnically shaped realities in the interpretation of the
20th century history in Latvia. Secondly, the state and academicians are not able to compete with the
media shaped products of the collective identities and history interpretation – these are the media of
collective emotions. Thirdly, collective memories in both “groups” of ethnically divided society are
sustained and re-produced using generational bridges – beliefs in one’s ethnic version of Latvian history
are acting as unifying elements of identities over generational changes and controversies. Past is what
shapes ethnically divided youth and builds bridges over generations within one ethnic group.
New technical tools, such as internet websites, chats or other social networks are used to come back
to the past of one’s own ethnic memories which in return produce meanings, explain social division
and even judicial differences between citizens and non-citizens. Technical tools may vary, but these
“memorydevices”donotcreategenerationgapswhenethnicityinconcerned.Onthecontrary,collective
memory can overcome obstacles created on its way by history as science. Political and media discourses
provide far more appealing versions for believing, not analysing one’s ethnic identity of which past is
an integral part.
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